Nuclear safeguards
Nuclear materials and technologies can be used in the civil sector for medical, industrial, research and energy production purposes. However, they can also be unduly used for the development of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear safeguards are technical and procedural measures taken to ensure that nuclear materials, nuclear materials and technologies are used for peaceful purposes.
Nuclear materials subject to nuclear safeguards
Nuclear materials subject to safeguards include special fissile materials (e.g. plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233) from which nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices could easily be manufactured and raw materials (e.g. natural uranium , depleted uranium or thorium) which cannot be used directly for the manufacture of nuclear weapons but whose use following further processing cannot be excluded.
Radioactive sources that do not contain uranium, plutonium or thorium are not subject to the nuclear safeguards regime.
The measures that are applied for nuclear safeguards
Controls related to nuclear safeguards are exercised through various control and verification measures which include:
1. Nuclear Materials Accounting: consists of monitoring and accurately recording the quantities of nuclear materials produced, used, transferred and stored. Nuclear operators must periodically transmit this information to regulatory bodies;
2. Inspections: Inspectors directly verify the information provided by nuclear operators on nuclear accounting. These inspections can include instrumental verification of materials using different radiometric measurement techniques, sampling and subsequent analysis of samples collected on site, and verification of plant characteristics;
3. Surveillance and Remote Control: Installation of cameras and other monitoring devices to ensure that nuclear materials are not tampered with or misused. These devices can operate continuously and provide real-time data to regulatory bodies;
4. Seals and Other Containment Devices: Use of electronic and physical seals to ensure that containers of nuclear materials are not opened without authorization;
5. Environmental Analysis: Collection and analysis of environmental samples around nuclear facilities to detect any traces of undeclared or improperly used nuclear materials.
The bodies responsible for the application of nuclear safeguards
The safeguard regime is exercised at different levels: international, community and national.
The most important international agreement regulating the possession of nuclear weapons is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In force since 1970, it prohibits "militarily nuclear states" from transferring nuclear weapons or other explosive devices to anyone, and "militarily non-nuclear states" from producing themselves or obtaining possession of them in any other way. In this context, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for verifying the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programs of non-nuclear militarily states.
The IAEA is in fact the key element of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Under the Treaty, Non-Nuclear Power States continue to have the legitimate right to develop programs exclusively for the civilian use of nuclear energy, and the NPT places the responsibility on the IAEA to ensure that such states do not divert the use of nuclear materials and technologies towards non-peaceful ends. The IAEA therefore verifies, through its system of checks and inspections, that member countries comply with their obligations deriving from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other non-proliferation agreements on the use of nuclear materials and technologies for exclusively peaceful purposes. To this end, the IAEA concludes safeguard agreements with Member States, with which the states agree to submit to the inspection powers of the Agency itself.
For the Member States of the European Union, the Euratom Treaty is in force which provides that the Commission, regardless of the methods of use, verifies that minerals, raw materials and special fissile materials are not diverted from the uses to which their users have declared to allocate them. Under the Euratom Treaty, the Commission monitors the appropriate (in particular, non-military) and peaceful use of nuclear materials: Euratom checks are carried out by specialized inspectors, who carry out physical and accounting checks in all nuclear installations in Community.
For the Member States of the Community that do not have nuclear weapons, the two control and verification regimes, that of the IAEA and that of the Commission, are harmonized with the Safeguards Agreement, called the Euratom-IAEA Verification Agreement (INFCIRC 193) , which provides that the Community also carries out the controls provided for by the NPT in the Member States, while the IAEA ensures the verification of the results of the community control.
Euratom controls are implemented through EURATOM Regulation 302/2005, valid for all member states of the Community. It allows Member States that are signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to meet their obligations under the Verification Agreement.
The Regulation establishes the requirements that regulate the transmission to the Commission, by operators, of information and data concerning the materials and the installations where they are held. Based on the information transmitted by the Commission, the IAEA carries out specific analyzes of data and information and conducts inspections on the various facilities.
In addition to the levels of control and verification at community and international level, there is national control over the matters. The art. 44 of Legislative Decree 101/2020 establishes the methods of keeping the records relating to the accounting of nuclear materials and of periodic reporting to the ISIN. The legislation provides for the sending of detention reports both to the Ministry of the Environment and Energy Security (MASE) and to the ISIN. The transmission of data and accounting to ISIN takes place via the STRIMS platform (Waste Material and Source Traceability System) managed by ISIN itself which collects this information constituting the database of the holders.
The Inspectorate also carries out direct supervisory actions on the information transmitted (accounting and physical inventories).
The additional protocol to the Safeguard Agreement
Since the system of traditional safeguards (based on the control of nuclear materials) did not prevent some states not adhering to the NPT from acquiring nuclear weapons, in the 1990s the process of reviewing the system itself began which led, to the beginnings of 2000s, to the drafting of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguard Agreement.
The Protocol extended the IAEA's control activities to studies, including theoretical ones, of equipment and activities that in some way relate to the nuclear fuel cycle.
With Law no. 332/2003, the model of Additional Protocol valid for the states of the European Union not equipped with nuclear weapons was implemented at national level, and with a subsequent decree the methods of application of the same law to national operators were established.
The scope of this regulatory novation is decidedly vast and its application is still incomplete; in particular, the new application model, defined as "integrated safeguards", extends the State's control on the matter also to universities that carry out studies with implications on the fuel cycle and, more generally, on dual-use goods that can be used in industry nuclear; Even the industries that build or provide support for the use of the aforementioned dual-use goods are subject to the new obligations set by the Additional Protocol.
The law identifies the Ministry of the Environment and Energy Security (MASE) as the competent Administration for local activities. MASE has delegated, through an onerous agreement, almost all of the reporting activities and all of the field verification actions to ISIN. The effect of the delegation involves, for ISIN, the management of a computerized document center and the need to proceed with the verification of the declarations produced by the operators which constitute the basis for the national declaration, for which the State is responsible, which through the EURATOM is forwarded to the IAEA.
The IAEA, on the basis of the declarations made, together with the information available, including on the so-called "open sources", verifies the correctness of the information and, if necessary, proceeds to request further information or specific inspection access.
The role of ISIN in integrated safeguards
In relation to the framework outlined above, the ISIN, in order to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations of the Italian State regarding safeguards, verifies the operators' declarations to the Commission and represents the State towards the European Commission and the IAEA during inspections. ISIN in fact participates in EURATOM and IAEA inspections, contributing to ensuring the fulfillment of the obligations deriving for the State from the Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol and verifying that the inspections are carried out in the manner envisaged by the Agreements themselves.